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This chapter adds to the perspective of comparative politics the lens of comparative public 
policy or policy analysis. Though technocracy as challenge to democracy has been explored 
by comparative politics as a distinctive mode of political representation (Caramani 2017, 
Habermas 2015), comparative public policy has a research focus on the policy process. It 
brings in the granularity of the policy processes. With policy processes centre stage, one sees 
more clearly variations across patterns of technocratic challenges. Further, clarity and 
granularity are delivered in this chapter via a taxonomic contribution to the topics that 
motivate the volume. Classifications help to disentangle complex conceptual constructs, 
expose the risks of conceptual stretching, and, most importantly, shed light on dimensions of 
a scientific discussion that deserve more attention and require greater nuance. 
The organization of this chapter in simple. The next section shows differences and 
opportunities to develop connections between comparative politics and comparative public 
policy. Then we introduce the public policy “take” on technocracy by distinguishing between 
two modes – technocracy as comparative political scientists understand it and epistemic 
learning as the preeminent public policy frame. Using a taxonomic approach, we build on 
these foundations delineating four types of epistemic learning – the conditions for their 
emergence and dysfunctional or degenerative forms. Drawing on this, we conceptualise three 
more learning modes where experts’ contribute to policy making: reflexive arenas, bargaining 
environments and hierarchical structures. Our conclusions echo the themes of the concluding 
chapter of this volume. Paraphrasing the title of Eri Bertsou’s Conclusions, expertise is 
neither an absolute friend or an absolute foe of democracy. It can degenerate into 
technocracy, but it can be a formidable resource of representative democracy. Its contribution 
depends on scope conditions that are revealed by the analysis of the policy process. This 
chapter is an effort to identify and justify theoretically these scope conditions. 
 
 
Comparative Public Policy as Lens 
 
Comparative politics and comparative public policy are not in contrast. In fact, one 
complements the findings of the other when it comes to technocracy – see also the definitions 
and arguments about technocracy in the chapter by Bickerton and Invernizzi-Accetti in this 
volume. Despina Alexiadou in Chapter 7 and Silvana Târlea and Stefanie Bailer in Chapter 8 
explore the policy consequences of technocratic governments. Yet, in comparative politics, 
the focus on technocracy concerns the challenges to democracy in contemporary political 
systems, as well as the theoretical limitations and the empirical failures of present and past 
political projects informed by technocratic claims. As Caramani (2017 and Introduction to the 
volume) argues, the key research question in the field is about technocracy as mode of 
representation – a mode that stands in contrast to the pluralist and the populist modes. We are 
therefore in the field of political representation, rather than public policy. Comparative 
politics explores under which conditions actors, discourses and institutions are grounded in 
technocracy as mode of representation, and therefore challenge or violate the conditions of 
democratic representation. 
Some authors have connected public policy and representation.1 Others have connected 
public administration and the democratic dilemmas presented by technocrats (Tucker 2018, 
Vibert 2007). Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 of this volume show the policy consequences of 
technocratic governments – in these chapters policies are examined as output of a system of 
representation, in classic comparative politics fashion. 
However, in comparative public policy there hasn’t be a solid body of policy-orientated 
research on the juxtaposition between the technological organisation of policy problems and 
needs of democratic decision – a lack of confrontation that arguably contributed to post-war 
disillusionment with the technocratic movement (see Akin 1977, Ellul 1964, Meynaud 1964). 
For comparative public policy researchers, the main focus is on the policy process. Here, 
instead of monoliths like “technocracy”, policy analysts identify patterns and variations, often 
within the same country across time or policy domains. Rather than technocracy per se, the 
analysis of the policy process reveals in granular ways different pathological and 
physiological types of knowledge utilization and a range of roles played by varieties of 
experts in public choices. The public policy literature has developed around a normative as 
well as empirical concern for the democratization of expertise and the possible usages of 
knowledge in the policy process. The key research question is under which conditions it is 
efficient and legitimate for a democratic political system to rely on policy processes where 
actors, discourses and institutions privilege professional expertise and technical-scientific 
knowledge. 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Fischer (1990, 1993, 2009) on think tanks and the politics of 
expertise, and Radaelli (2003) on the representation of expertise in the European Union (EU). 
Arguably, this reflects the different foci of the two disciplines: comparative politics 
compares political systems with a macro orientation; comparative public policy works (most 
of the time) at the level of policy sectors and policy processes (hence at the meso and 
sometimes the micro level of individual actors such as independent regulatory bodies and 
elite scientific experts). Technocracy as concept is definitively macro. At the meso-level, we 
find granular concepts like bureaucratic politics, epistemic communities, independent think 
tanks and, moving towards the macro level, Majone’s notion of “the regulatory state” 
(Majone 1996). In policy analysis, the emphasis on knowledge utilization and the 
democratization of science/expertise is predominant. 
Thus, to return to our metaphor of the lens, comparative political scientists put their 
lens on technocracy and its “threats” or “challenges” to democracy. By contrast, comparative 
policy analysts out their lens on concepts such as scientific communities, technical 
bureaucracies, economists in government, regulators, research institutes and scientists in 
governmental bodies, and are concerned about how to make the most efficient and 
democratically legitimate usage of these knowledge providers. This joins the possibility of 
considering technocracy as a sort of “corrective”, as mentioned in the Conclusion to this 
volume, as well as in its Introduction. Indeed, much as there are differences, there are also 
possibilities to join comparative politics and comparative public policy. Comparative public 
policy research, pitched empirically at the micro and meso level, speaks to the dichotomy 
between responsiveness and responsibility often evoked in comparative politics, which is 
empirically situated at the macro level. Policy processes geared towards technocratic modes 
perform better on responsibility rather than responsiveness. And one conclusion to our 
chapter is that under certain conditions expertise is a corrective to the current state of 
representative democracy. 
To explore connections, we need to address questions such as: What are the main 
pathways at the micro and meso-level or modes in which the policy process produces 
learning and benefits from expertise? Further, what blocks these learning pathways – and, yet 
again to connect comparative politics and comparative public policy, do these pathways stand 
up to our criteria of democratic legitimacy? These are questions that intersect the themes of 
the Introduction and the lessons drawn in the concluding chapter of the volume. 
To build these connections between policy processes and the macro dimension, we are  
not alone. For Charles Lindblom (1965) policy processes produce learning if they connect lay 
and professional knowledge. Interestingly, he rejected pure expertise-driven ‘intellectual 
cogitation’ in favour of partisan mutual adjustment. Thus, politics and the bargaining 
processes typical of representative democracy are essential to the theory of the policy 
process. Indeed, Lindblom developed a theory of the policy process that is also a theory of 
representation. Another exception is the field of critical policy studies, in part connected to 
critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 2013), in part inspired by another founding father of 
policy analysis, Harold Lasswell (Lerner and Lasswell 1956; Torgerson 1985, 1992; 
Turnbull, 2008, 2018). We therefore wish to build on the efforts made in the past by 
Lindblom and Lasswell to connect rather than separating and contrasting policy processes 
and representative democracy. 
The previous discussion leads us to offer a taxonomic approach to break down the 
monolith of technocracy – in line with what we said above about the granularity of research 
on policy processes. Our objective is to pin down scope conditions under which the 
utilization of professional knowledge is legitimate and efficient, and the conditions that 
generate democratic pathologies, or simply inefficient and distorted usages of expertise 2 
                                                          
2 Throughout, we will keep the language simple. We will not draw on the specialist 
vocabulary of theories of the policy process (e.g. multiple streams, punctuated equilibria, 
 
Exploring Technocracy: From Comparative Politics to Comparative Public Policy 
 
Recall that in comparative politics technocracy is a mode of representation that challenges 
democracy. Empirically, its references are actors, discourses and institutions (Caramani 2017 
and Introduction to the volume). In comparative public policy, the empirical references are 
the same. But, in this discipline the main approach to concept formation is the following: 
technocracy is conceptually framed as a mode of knowledge utilization. Further, technocracy 
is not exactly a macro-concept that captures the essence of a whole political system – hence, 
for example, we can talk of “technocratic governments” in countries A and B at time “t”. 
Instead, we argue that the concept of technocracy in comparative public policy is a mode of 
policy-making that sits alongside other concepts like bureaucratic politics, political decision-
making and epistemic communities (for this argument, see Radaelli [1999: 763, especially 
figure 1]). Consequently, even when looking at the same country, policy analysts talks about 
policy processes in one sector (say, taxation) being technocratic and another (say, media 
regulation) being more bureaucratic (Radaelli 1999). Or, a sector can move from bureaucratic 
politics to epistemic communities over time, and so on. 
Thus, we need to spend some more time on concept formation in comparative public 
policy and consider some definitions. Indeed, it is instructive to compare technocracy with 
the concept of epistemic communities (Haas 1990, 1992a, 1992b) – the darker and brighter 
sides of knowledge utilization. In the epistemic mode, the policy process revolves around 
highly uncertain but salient policy issues. Epistemic modes occur when there is a process of 
inspiration, interpretation and institutionalization in policy choice of a policy paradigm or, to 
                                                          
advocacy coalitions and so on, see Weible and Sabatier 2017) to ease the conversation with 
our colleagues in the field of comparative politics. 
simplify, a cause-and-effect policy lesson taught by experts. The final decision makers are 
not the experts themselves, but elected politicians and/or their bureaucracies: epistemic 
communities “create reality, but not as they wish” (Adler and Haas 1992: 381). Hence, the 
standards of legitimacy are not violated, or at least not necessarily. The communities of 
experts that coalesce around an epistemic cause-and-effect lesson are socially certified: it is 
society, not theology or divinity, which allows a central banker, a regulator, a genetic 
scientist, a geographer to provide decisive input to policy choice. 
By contrast, and here we carry on with the same literature (Radaelli 1999), technocratic 
modes occur in opaque policy domains, with low salience but highly technical policy issues 
(Peters and Barker 1993).3 The technocratic mode in these domains is often triggered by a 
bureaucrat, not necessarily an expert drawn from outside public administration. There is little 
learning in technocratic modes – this contrasts markedly with the conditions defining 
epistemic modes. The technocrats do not necessarily belong to the class of actors with high 
social certification and high specialization – they often provide routine tasks and take 
decisions insulated from the scrutiny of the media, parliaments, and political parties. What 
makes technocracy inefficient is the absence of policy learning. But, what makes it a 
legitimacy challenge for democracy is the fact that the political implications of policy choice 
are denied. Conflict over policy ends is silenced. Here, problems are seen as eminently 
computational, hence ‘the correct answer’ exists, even if it takes considerable specialist 
knowledge and sophisticated information to arrive at this answer (Radaelli 1999). 
We come to the end of this brief excursus with a nuanced understanding of different 
modes. Taxonomically, the presence of issue salience, the level of uncertainty and the social 
                                                          
3 We follow this literature because it allows us to develop the taxonomic approach that 
is the backbone of this chapter. However, we acknowledge that other ways to categorize 
technocracy are possible – for example one could argue that technocracy is also present in 
salient policy issues, for example in health policy and austerity policies. 
certification of expertise appear to discriminate among a range of modes. Two modes in 
particular share elected affinities yet diverge in their impact on legitimacy: technocracy and 
epistemic learning. For comparative public policy researchers, the main issue is how not to 
throw away the baby with the bath water: can we identify scope conditions that deliver some 
of the benign effects of knowledge utilization without degenerating into the horrors of 
technocracy? This brings us to the next section, where we start from the epistemic mode, 
decompose it using taxonomical reasoning again, and draw implications for legitimacy. 
 
Expertise in Public Policy: The Brighter Side and the Darker Corners 
 
Let us carry on with our taxonomic approach taking a normative turn: what are the variables 
that define acceptable and unacceptable professional expertise in the policy process? Here, 
we find a considerable amount of studies on delegation to non-majoritarian institutions, 
learning in public policy, and epistemic communities (for example, Checkel 2001, Demortain 
2011, Dezalay and Garth 2002, Dunlop 2009, Gilardi 2010). It is difficult to distil the essence 
of this literature in a small number of variables, but at the outset we can say that a minimal 
condition is the presence of professional knowledge based on advanced technical training, 
social science or natural science. It must be possible to attribute this knowledge to a well-
defined group of professionals, or economists, or scientists. These groups must also be able to 
connect their causal propositions to public policy problems without ambiguity, for example 
by showing how to implement a goal defined by elected politicians, such as to keep the 
inflation rate low or to protect the environment. 
These seem common-sense minimal conditions. Yet, they hide some difficult questions. 
For example, how does society get to identify these groups? What are the institutions where 
they should legitimately operate, perhaps with some protection from the electoral cycle? 
Should independent regulators be somewhat accountable to elected politicians and society at 
some point in the policy cycle, or is this detrimental to their mission? Given that expertise 
and the utilization of professional knowledge should foster processes of policy learning, who 
is ultimately in control of the objectives of learning, the experts or those who contest 
elections and represent citizens? 
To shed light on these questions, we draw on recent advances in the literature on 
learning in public policy (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013). This is where we start to pin down the 
variables we are looking for. The first two variables that justify delegation of tasks to non-
majoritarian institutions and epistemic groups are the impossibility to calculate the pay-offs 
of alternative courses of action and the social certification of a group, organization or actor. If 
the pay-offs are computable, then the classic democratic theory of representation (and in 
public policy Charles Lindblom) suggests that the best option is pluralist bargaining and 
representational rules that allow different preferences to be aggregated and composed to get 
to a final public choice. Radical uncertainty, by contrast, puts societal and political actors in a 
situation of gambling rather that a situation of calculability of pay-offs. Different groups still 
have their preferences, but they cannot relate them unambiguously to different policy choices 
and therefore cannot rank alternative courses of action. Hence, our first variable is the 
presence of uncertainty. 
The second variable is social certification: who and what makes central bankers, heads 
of regulatory agencies, standard setting organizations more or less legitimate to carry out the 
tasks they have? Who decides who can do what? Obviously, it is not a divine right. It is a 
social choice, in turn anchored to culture, tradition, market-pressure, political necessity, even 
conditionality. For example, in the context of accession to the European Union (EU), 
prospective member states are asked to set up competition and regulatory authorities that do 
not respond to political masters. In the recent episodes of successive bail-outs of Greece, one 
important condition set by the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and 
the International Monetary Fund was the independence of the statistics authority in that 
country. 
Thus, our second variable is the presence, in a given place and historical context, of social 
certification of a group of actors sharing some beliefs about their ‘science’ and how this 
science can be applied to public policy. Without social certification of these professional 
groups we cannot even think of calibrating professional knowledge utilization in public 
policy around legitimate democratic politics. 
We can then carry on and explore what happens when social certification and 
uncertainty co-exist. We assume that professional expertise and knowledge are used to 
improve on public policy; in short, they are used to foster learning. Drawing on Dunlop 
(2009), let us make another taxonomic step and ask two questions: who is in control of the 
objectives of learning? And turning to the content and means of learning, who controls them? 
There are two options: either the experts are in control, or other actors (for example, actors 
that represent people or interest groups) are. The result is this two-by-two matrix (Figure 
10.1). 
Figure 10.1 Expanding the epistemic mode 
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Source: Dunlop (2009: figure 2; 2017: Figure 2); Dunlop and Radaelli (2013: Figure 2). 
 
We see that only in one case we can possibly identify the pure situation of the experts 
behaving like teachers. Basically, this is the most optimistic narrative provided by the 
literature on epistemic communities where expert enclaves guide policy makers on both the 
form and objectives of policy (Haas 1992a, 1992b). In the other three cells of Figure 10.1 the 
expert assists other actors in the policy process by: providing standards when the content of 
learning is set by other actors; contributing to objectives and content (of policy learning) set 
by others; facilitating the achievement of the objective of learning with specific content. 
Typical cases are standard-setting by international organizations when the objective is set by 
governments (for example, net neutrality standards); technical knowledge deployed to assist 
pension reforms when the government sets the final objective and the parameters about 
timing and cohorts affected by the reform; economists working on a plan to reduce the deficit 
when the government leaves them free to choose the means of deficit reduction. 
The most important message in Figure 10.1 in that is all four cases there is a learning 
relationship: the expert has a dialogic relationship with other actors. Even in the bottom-left 
quadrant the teachers are not authoritarian despots. They teach lessons to an audience. A is 
still talking to B, persuading, communicating, and so on. Experts may define the solution 
(imagine, a plan to reduce health expenditure in a country) but they rarely control 
implementation – this is left to bureaucracies. In the other three quadrants, the relationship is 
even more obviously dialectic (see Dunlop 2017 for an empirical application). 
Another interesting implication of this analysis is that to really violate the basic 
conditions of democratic life and enter the world of technocracy, we need to jump-out of the 
figure so to speak. Put differently, we must violate the pre-conditions that identify situations 
where these four variations of expert-driven policy learning are possible (Table 10.1).4 The 
obvious case is when societies trust the wrong experts or assign to experts tasks that are better 
carried out using partisan mutual adjustment. Further, the experts may be wrongly identified, 
they may silence important minority positions (the Galileo syndrome) and favour scientific 
group-thinking, misjudge social risks, and stifle social innovation. 
Next we have the case of policy instruments that bias the policy process towards 
expertise. Consider for example regulatory impact assessment processes that are now 
mandatory in many countries (Dunlop and Radaelli 2016 for an overview). With regulatory 
impact assessment, a government makes the commitment to gather and publish evidence of 
the likely impacts of proposed regulation on a wide range of stakeholders, the economy and 
the environment. Thus, the authorization for governmental intervention via regulation does 
no longer lie in representation and the democratic mandate, but in following some criteria of 
economic analysis or more generally evidence-based policy. 
                                                          
4 These are not imaginary cases. See Dror (1971a, 1971b) for a fuller discussion of the 
possible defects of scientists involved in policy making. 
Table 10.1 Degenerations of epistemic learning 
Epistemic communities 
approached as … 





Producer of standards 
Supporting robust evidence 
creation 
Failure to produce robust 
knowledge 
Facilitator Defining policy relevance 







Source: Dunlop (2017, adapted from Table 1). 
 
It can therefore be argued that policy instruments like impact assessment bias the stage 
of policy formulation towards economic analysis. Is this bias acceptable, under which 
conditions? Should policy formulation and evaluation be left in the hands of economists 
trained in benefit-cost analysis or draw on participatory techniques ? Should policy 
formulation be left in the hands of Weberian bureaucracies accountable to their ministers, 
instead? This question has no general answer. It depends on the preferences of society and on 
how expertise, technical information, data are handled by economists, bureaucrats and 
politicians – indeed we are aware of forms of benefit-cost analysis open to societal and 
political argumentation (Sunstein 2011). 
Time also makes a difference. Regulators do not always keep their reputation intact 
over time: they often bump into problems that are too political not to raise contestation. They 
may be attacked by some parties in opposition. And, these parties may one day form a new 
government hostile to these regulators, or simply with different views about the degree of 
independence. Governments may, over time, reduce the autonomy of environmental and 
health and safety agencies – in turn responding to slow but deep movements of public 
opinion and markets. Central bankers, economic advisers, ethics committees, climate change 
scientists, chief medical advisers make mistake: they may be in the position of the teacher but 
teach the wrong lesson – after all, science proceeds by conjectures and confutations. When 
epistemic reputation suffers, the degree of social certification declines. 
To conclude, we identified conditions for an appropriate and legitimate usage of 
expertise. Invariably, these conditions are contingent on the existence of dialogic channels 
between the experts and other actors. When there is no dialogue and the conditions are 
violated, we can talk of technocratic challenges to democracy. When there are no learning 
dynamics, the efficiency of public policy cannot improve. 
 
Different Modes of Learning 
 
In turn, learning is generated by different causal factors. Grounding policy choice in 
expertise, technical knowledge, policy instruments based on rational calculation and scientific 
modes of thinking is not the only way in which societies produce learning for public policy.  
Yet again, the literature we referred to above (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013) has 
contrasted epistemic learning with other ways in which learning is generated. First, we find 
again Charles Lindblom’s partisan mutual adjustment (Lindblom 1959, 1980). This is a 
pluralist mode wherein different groups exchange resources in the process of bargaining and 
problems are solved by interaction rather than scientific analysis. Bargaining however is not 
limited to the identification of a compromise leading to policy choice. It is also a formidable 
process to exchange information and to inform different actors about the constellation of 
preferences around a policy problems. Although learning is not the main motivation of the 
bargaining actors, it is a very important spin-off of their interaction. One interesting property 
of partisan mutual adjustment is that intellectual cogitation is not assigned a premium: 
experts do not have higher social certification, they bring their own preferences and 
information into the policy process. Social interaction, not intellectual cogitation, is the 
engine of learning in partisan mutual adjustment. 
Second, we have participatory processes based on reflexivity. Specifically, reflexivity 
refers to the possibility to change core policy beliefs as a result of social interaction. Here 
again all actors are equal in terms of social certification. The main engine is dense social 
interaction grounded in communicative rationality. There are many variations of participatory 
modes – for us the point to bear in mind is that experts have to accept the basic democratic 
rule that all knowledge, lay and professional, may potentially be relevant to solving policy 
problems. Here we are close to Eulau’s (1973) well-known vision of a ‘consultative 
commonwealth’. Participation is supposed to deliver on social learning and stable conflict 
resolution via reflexivity, hence this is yet another way to generate learning in policy.5 
If elected assemblies, bureaucrats, and courts have higher social certification, we can 
imagine learning occurring in the shadow of rules, hierarchies, legal structures and so on. 
Learning how to comply with these systems of rules is another valuable social property of our 
democracies, hence we include hierarchy in our list. Policy processes in the stage of rules 
enforcement can be considered manifestations of learning in hierarchies. Learning in these 
cases includes objects like the legitimate degrees of flexibility in implementation and 
compliance, what is sanctioned and what it not, and the attitudes of inspectors and street-level 
officers. 
                                                          
5 Schön and Rein (1994) illustrate the scope conditions for preference change. 
Figure 10.2 Conceptualising knowledge modes as policy learning 
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Source: Dunlop and Radaelli (2013: adapted from Figure 1). 
 
To conclude, learning can be produced by expertise, but also by partisan mutual 
adjustment, reflexivity, and hierarchies. What matters is the social certification of actors and 
the tractability of policy problems. In fact, when uncertainty is very high, bargaining is not 
possible and systems of rules are either meaningless or cannot produce compliance. This 
leads Dunlop and Radaelli (2013) to a four-fold taxonomy of learning in public policy 
(Figure 10.2). This taxonomy tells us that the epistemic mode works well when there is low 
issue problem tractability and high social certification of experts. However, we argue that it 
does not perform well in the following circumstances – circumstances for which one of the 
other three modes is, at least in terms of our conceptual analysis, more appropriate: 
 
 Composition of preferences (bargaining and reflexivity are superior) 
 Necessity to generate social consensus on the scope of rules, their flexibility and the 
nature of compliance (reflexivity and hierarchy are preferable to the epistemic mode) 
 Conflict resolution (bargaining and reflexivity are better) 
 Composition or modification of values, norms, deep core beliefs (reflexivity is the 
strongest performer) 
 Distributive choices (either distribution is set by rules or by persuasion, so hierarchy 
and reflexivity are preferable; alternatively we can imagine bargaining on compliance 
as a process distinct from bargaining on the initial policy choice. In any case, the 
epistemic mode comes last on our list). 
 
It follows that we run into technocratic challenges when we draw on actors, discourses, and 
institutions anchored to epistemic modes to address all the issues we listed above: 
composition of preferences, consensus creation, conflict resolution, values and distributional 
choices. Since societies have plenty of these issues and the nature of public policy is often 
contested, distributive and value-sensitive, it follows that expert-based modes have a limited 
legitimate place in public policy. However, this does not mean that experts should be 
excluded or play no role in policy processes. Rather, it means that they can and should still 
participate, but under conditions that are not the ones of privileged epistemic actors. To see 
this, we move to our final conceptual section. 
 
The Possible Roles of the Experts 
 
What are the possible roles for experts in these different learning arenas? Specifically, we are 
concerned with the communicative and political skills required to make effective, functional 
contributions in each. To do so, we draw one more time on the knowledge utilisation 
literature (Dunlop 2014: 215–21; for the seminal works see Dror 1967, 1984 and Meltsner 
1976 and, more recently, Pielke 2007). Table 10.2 illustrates the points we are making. 
Table 10.2 Possible roles of experts 
Learning mode … Communication skills … Political skills … 
Epistemic 




Ability to speak early in the 
policy process 
Commitment to open up science 
to lay knowledge at the early 
stage of problem definition 
Bargaining 
Ability to advocate policy 
choices on the basis of evidence 
whilst recognizing the domains 
where evidence is not 
conclusive 
Propensity to be involved in 
coalitions pro or against policy 
with clear roles 
Hierarchical Peripheral policy vision Institutional awareness 
Source: Dunlop (2014: 216 adapted from Table 2). 
 
We can dispense with the epistemic learning realm relatively quickly. Here, experts are 
privileged actors whose production of authoritative knowledge gives them special framing 
power (Dunlop, 2016). To ensure this power does not result in a-critical groupthink, experts 
must communicate with politicians in a dialogic manner – reflecting a willingness to 
persuade sometimes over long periods of time. Soft skills of communication are not enough 
however. Experts who operate in epistemic settings require humility about the knowledge 
they carry. Knowledge is dynamic after all, and this must be reflected in the advice they give. 
Being open where evidence is partial or a best guess helps protect experts from later charges 
of getting it “wrong”. 
Moving on to learning in issues steeped in reflexive impulses, the challenge for experts 
is to make meaningful contributions to social learning without de-basing their authority. This 
is tricky. True engagement in participatory processes means opening-up to the value-talk that 
characterises contested issues. Where expertise is being re-distributed, experts need to find 
ways to talk to citizens’ hearts as well as their minds. Politically, this scientific opening-up 
must be done before problems are fully defined. 
The idea of experts operating in interest-driven worlds of bargaining will sound like 
heresy to some. Yet, epistemic communities can and do facilitate heavily political policy 
debates or risk living in the fantasy that all policy can be driven by rational-technical inquiry 
alone (Benveniste 1977, Weiss 1992). Political participation without politicizing the research 
process itself is the goal here. Flourishing in such competitive worlds requires not only a 
willingness to come down from the side-lines and advocate policy positions (based on 
evidence), but also to act politically by joining advocacy coalitions. 
Finally, we meet the experts who set standards in hierarchical structures. How might 
these experts avoid the inertia and blocked innovation associated with such restrictive 
settings? Politically, experts in the shadow of hierarchy need a nuanced understanding of 
their room for manoeuvre; who are the veto players, where are the gaps in formal rules, what 
are the tacit codes that underpin how we do things round here etc. Once they have maximised 
their positions, experts can use their knowledge to widen the field of vision in ways that 
reshapes institutions and so policies. 
These are just four possible skill sets for experts; there are more, of course. Adopting 
our taxonomic approach perhaps obscures as well as illuminates. However, it does help us 
make clear connections between types of knowledge use in public policy and learning forms 
– epistemic and beyond. 
 
Conclusion: Expertise and Modes of Learning 
 
Experts and policy processes grounded in technical, professional and scientific knowledge 
have a role to play in the policy process. Arguably, the most important difference between 
comparative politics and comparative public policy is that the former has analysed 
technocracy whilst the latter has been more interested in the granularity of the policy process. 
It is exactly because of this focus that public policy research is able to classify and explain 
efficient-inefficient and legitimate-illegitimate types of (professional and scientific) 
knowledge utilization. The first conclusion is therefore that in comparative public policy, we 
find scope conditions defining the appropriateness of epistemic anchors to policy choice. 
The second conclusion is that any violation of these conditions brings us to the domain 
of technocratic illegitimacy and/or inefficient public policy choices. This contribution has 
shown that the conditions for appropriate usages of professional, technical, scientific 
knowledge are narrow and that societies often benefits from other usages. 
The third conclusion is that there is a legitimate role of experts in the policy process but 
this is not always the same role. It depends on the structure of the policy process. The 
democratically acceptable role and the overall efficiency of mobilising experts as policy 
actors vary according to the prevalent structural quality of a process – it can be epistemic, but 
it may well be a policy process informed by bargaining, reflexive communicative rationality 
or hierarchy. The role of the experts is determined by the games policy actors play. If experts 
operate in a hierarchical process by wrongly thinking they are inside a bargaining process, 
they are bound to be irrelevant or detrimental to democracy. 
Taken together, these conclusions and the underlying taxonomic analysis show that the 
discipline of comparative public policy should not shy away from addressing big, important, 
politically relevant questions like technocracy. With our exercise, we have shown that the 
public policy lens works well and can add clarity to topics that are often left to other, more 
“macro” disciplines like comparative politics. 
These conclusions are qualified by acknowledging that our contribution is taxonomic, 
ideal-typical and conceptual. If we were to introduce empirics we would certainly find many 
more variations that cannot be captured by ideal-types. At the same time, empirical analysis 
is the best way to corroborate or falsify our main propositions about the scope conditions – 
this seems an exciting avenue for future research in this field. 
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